Once the Bell is Rung: Revisiting Expert Admissibility in Wallis v Wawanesa

by | Nov 16, 2026 | Auto

Earlier this year, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice released two decisions concerning the admissibility of expert evidence in Wallis v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company. The decisions shed important light on a trial judge’s continuing role as a gatekeeper of expert evidence and the importance of a stricter approach to admissibility from the outset. This is particularly important given the potential prejudice and disruption that may arise when an admissibility ruling must be revisited after evidence has been presented to the trier of fact.

Background

The action arose from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 22, 2026. During the seven-week trial which commenced on March 30, 2026, the Plaintiff called her treating psychologist, Dr. Ann McDermid, as a litigation expert. Dr. McDermid treated the Plaintiff since April 2017. She remained involved in her care at the time of trial. Over the course of treatment, Dr. McDermid prepared three reports assessing the Plaintiff’s psychological condition.

The Defendant opposed Dr. McDermid’s qualification as a litigation expert, arguing that her evidence should be confined to that of a participant expert. The Defendant primarily argued that Dr. McDermid lacked the independence and impartiality required by Rule 4.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and had failed to comply with Rule 53.03.

Expert Evidence and Rule 53.03: The Westerhof Framework

Westerhof v Gee Estate, is the seminal decision of the Court of Appeal addressing the distinction between litigation experts, participant experts, non-party experts, and the application of Rule 53.03. In Westerhof, the court distinguished between the following categories of expert witnesses:

  • Litigation expert: an expert witness engaged by or on behalf of a party to provide opinion evidence in relation to a proceeding. A litigation expert must comply with Rule 53.03.
  • Participant expert: an expert witness not engaged for the purpose of litigation. These witnesses are typically involved in the underlying events (i.e. treating practitioners). Generally, they have already documented their opinions in notes or summaries that do not comply with Rule 53.03. They are entitled to testify about the patient history they obtained, the tests they performed, the associated results, and their observations of the patient.
  • Non-party expert: an expert retained by a non-party (i.e. SABS insurers) who form opinions based on personal observations or examinations relating to the subject matter of the litigation for a purpose other than the litigation. No compliance with Rule 53.03 is necessary.

The court confirmed that a witness with special skill, knowledge, training or experience who has not been engaged by or on behalf of a party to the litigation may give opinion evidence for the truth of its contents without complying with rule 53.03 where:

(1) the opinion to be given is based on the witness’ observation of or participation in the events at issue; and

(2) the witness formed the opinion to be given as part of the ordinary exercise of his or her skill, knowledge, training and experience while observing or participating in such events.

However, where a participant expert or non-party expert proffers opinion evidence extending beyond the limits described above, compliance with Rule 53.03 is necessary with respect to the portion of their opinions extending beyond those limits.

In Westerhof, the court emphasized that the court retains its gatekeeper function in relation to opinion evidence from participant experts and non-party experts. Therefore, if evidence does not meet the test for admissibility, a court may exclude all or part of the opinion evidence of a participant expert or non-party expert or rule that all or part of such evidence is not admissible for the truth of its contents. The court could also require that the participant expert or non-party expert comply with Rule 53.03 if the participant or non-party expert’s opinion goes beyond the scope of an opinion formed in the course of treatment or observation for purposes other than the litigation.

Initial Decision (Wallis v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company)

In the initial decision of Wallis v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, the trial judge reviewed the three reports authored by Dr. McDermid. With respect to her first report dated March 2, 2018, the trial judge found that she answered the questions posed and provided a cogent explanation for her conclusions. The report did not demonstrate any evident lack of objectivity that would rise to the level of disqualification. The report did not contain Dr. McDermid’s qualifications, employment, or educational experiences. The report did not reference documentation that Dr. McDermid relied on in forming her opinion. Thus, the report was deemed non-compliant with Rule 53.03.

In her second report, dated February 20, 2025, Dr. McDermid set out her qualifications, employment history, and educational background. The trial judge found nothing in the report itself that raised concerns regarding Dr. McDermid’s objectivity. However, the report included a list of documents she purportedly reviewed, including a reference to a “medical brief index.” The medical brief index itself was not appended to the report, which the trial judge recognized was problematic. This omission was problematic since it was unclear what materials comprised the brief and formed the foundation for her opinions.

In her third and final report, dated February 6, 2026, Dr. McDermid responded to the opinions of the Defendant’s neuropsychological expert and addressed the Plaintiff’s future care cost assessment. Unlike the earlier reports, this report was accompanied by a signed Form 53.

Despite acknowledging deficiencies within the reports, the trial judge deemed that the reports, viewed collectively, were compliant with Rule 53. The trial judge determined that any failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 53.03 in the first report were cured in the subsequent reports. It was held that any deficiencies could be addressed on cross-examination. The reports were deemed to provide the necessary information for the Defendant to understand Dr. McDermid’s opinions and the foundation for those opinions.

Regarding impartiality, the trial judge observed that Dr. McDermid’s doctor-patient relationship with the Plaintiff would undoubtedly have some impact on her ability to be objective. However, since Dr. McDermid’s written reports did not take on the appearance of advocacy, she was permitted to testify as both a participant and litigation expert.

Revisited Decision (Wallis v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company)

The trial judge revisited his earlier ruling following the commencement of Dr. McDermid’s cross-examination. The trial judge acknowledged that his initial ruling had been based, in part, on a misunderstanding of the materials Dr. McDermid reviewed in preparing her February 20, 2025 report.

During Dr. McDermid’s cross-examination, it became apparent that, when preparing her February 20, 2025 report, she had only reviewed two reports and a list of documents identified as the “medical brief index,” rather than the underlying records referenced in that index. While the trial judge maintained that the reports presented as objective on their face, he acknowledged that his initial assessment had been influenced by the erroneous belief that Dr. McDermid had been exposed to most, if not the entire, medical file when authoring her report. It was discovered during cross-examination that Dr. McDermid had neither reviewed nor requested the underlying records before authoring her report. This raised significant concerns given the February 20, 2025 report contained the bulk of Dr. McDermid’s opinion evidence.

It was further discovered during cross-examination that in the days leading up to trial, Dr. McDermid contacted Plaintiff’s Counsel and obtained the Plaintiff’s family physician records for review in preparation for her testimony. She was unable to identify which portions of the records she had reviewed and which portions she had not.

It emerged that, on the first day of trial, Dr. McDermid received an expert reports brief as part of what she described as her “due diligence” to ensure compliance with her duty to provide fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence. She testified that she reviewed only some of the materials contained within the brief. She was unable to identify which specific documents she had read.

It was evident that Dr. McDermid had relied extensively on the summaries of evidence contained in the Plaintiff’s two medical reports, which she had reviewed in preparing her own reports. She further indicated that the Plaintiff would occasionally bring reports to their treatment sessions for her review, which she would return to the Plaintiff afterward. Accordingly, those reports were not contained in her file.

Dr. McDermid took the position that a psychological opinion within the scope of her expertise was being tendered and thus it was not relevant if she knew particulars concerning the Plaintiff’s physical health both pre- and post-accident. The Defendant argued that the opinions provided in Dr. McDermid’s reports extended beyond the scope of a participant expert since the reports commented on the Plaintiff’s ability to perform physical activities, pain exacerbation, cognitive effects, causation, and competitive employability. Following cross-examination, the trial judge deemed that Dr. McDermid lacked an understanding of the Plaintiff’s pre-accident physical and psychological condition.

The trial judge recognized that assessing the Plaintiff’s pre- and post-accident functioning required an adequate understanding of her functional abilities at both relevant times. It was deemed that Dr. McDermid’s understanding of the Plaintiff’s condition was derived primarily from the Plaintiff’s self-reports. During re-examination, Dr. McDermid testified that her review of the Plaintiff’s physiatry report provided sufficient insight into the Plaintiff’s condition and that no further records were required to support her opinions. The trial judge concluded that, by relying on the Plaintiff’s self-reports, Dr. McDermid’s analysis lacked objectivity. It was emphasized that the “role of a fair, objective and non-partisan expert is not to simply parrot the plaintiff’s evidence.”

The trial judge determined that Dr. McDermid was not an objective witness and that her reports did not comply with Rule 53.03, contrary to his initial assessment. He noted that a litigation expert’s obligation continues from their retainer until the completion of the expert’s evidence. Dr. McDermid had reviewed select documentation but could not identify which materials she had reviewed. Prior to her examination in chief, she failed to disclose the records she reviewed leading up to trial. As a result, the court could not discern how subsequently reviewed documents affected her testimony. The trial judge was not satisfied that the court had sufficient evidence to determine what documentation Dr. McDermid based her opinions on. This was found to be “fatal to her ability to testify as a litigation expert”. Accordingly, Dr. McDermid was disqualified as a litigation expert under Rule 53.03.

Key Takeaways

The decisions serve as an important reminder that an expert witness’s duty of objectivity is ongoing. An expert’s obligations do not end upon delivery of a report. Rather, the duty to provide fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence continues during litigation and through to the completion of the expert’s testimony.

The decisions highlight the admissibility challenges that arise when treating practitioners provide evidence as litigation experts. While a treating practitioner may, in appropriate circumstances, testify as both a participant expert and a litigation expert, the existence of a treatment relationship may impact the witness’s objectivity. Further, where a practitioner offers opinions concerning post-loss functioning, prognosis, and causation, those opinions must be grounded in an adequate understanding of the individual’s pre- and post-loss condition. A failure to undertake the necessary comparative analysis may raise concerns regarding the expert’s objectivity.

Further, the decisions serve as a caution against treating deficiencies in Rule 53.03 reports as mere technical irregularities capable of being cured through cross-examination or subsequent disclosure. The decisions demonstrate the risks associated with admitting expert evidence despite concerns regarding Rule 53.03 compliance. Once opinion evidence has been heard by the trier of fact, significant prejudice may result if the admissibility ruling must later be revisited. These concerns are particularly acute in jury trials, since cautionary instructions may not fully eliminate the impact of inadmissible opinion evidence that has been presented. The decisions raise the question of whether a stricter approach to expert admissibility may be warranted in future cases.

Finally, the decisions reaffirm that a trial judge’s gatekeeper role is continuous. A trial judge is not bound by an earlier admissibility ruling and may revisit the qualification of an expert witness where developments during the evidence raise concerns regarding objectivity or compliance with Rule 53.03.

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1 Westerhof v. Gee Estate, 2015 ONCA 206

 

  • Emily Rasic

    When she’s not in the office grappling legal principles, Emily finds her zen on a yoga mat, keeping her mind as flexible as her litigation strategies. On weekends, you’ll likely find Emily exploring new hiking trails outside the city searching for precedent-setting views. Who knew that navigating various terrains could be such great practice for navigating case law?

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